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THE RELIANCE INTEREST IN INSOLVENCY LAW: A
RESPONSE TO HARRIS AND MOONEY
EdwardJ. Janger*
In their provocative contribution to this Symposium,' Steve Harris
and Chuck Mooney launch a full frontal assault on proposed section 103
2
of the Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 ("Durbin-Delahunt").
That provision would amend section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code3 to
elevate the Trustee in Bankruptcy ("TIB" or "trustee") from a mere
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thank you to Dana Brakman-Reiser, Neil Cohen,

David Reiss, Spencer Weber Waller and Elizabeth Warren for comments on an earlier draft.
Thank you also to Dean Joan Wexler, and the Dean's Research Fund for generous financial
support. Mistakes are, of course, mine alone.
I Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death of
the Avoidance Powers under Section 103 of the Durbin-Delahunt Bill: What Were They
Thinking?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829 (2004). Note, this response was initially drafted in
response to Harris and Mooney's oral presentation at the Cardozo Law Review Symposium. As
the footnotes show, they had the benefit of this response as they drafted the final version of their
article.
2 Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (also known as the Durbin-Delahunt bill), S.
2798, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. § 103, available at http:/thomas.loc.gov/home/cl07query
.html. Section 103 provides as follows:
(a) Trustee as lien creditor. Section 544(a) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended(1) by inserting ", the debtor," after "knowledge of the trustee";
(2) by inserting ", property of the estate," after "property of the debtor";
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking "or" at the end;
(4) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; or"; and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
"(4) a good faith purchaser of property that"(A) gave value for such property as of the time of the commencement of
the case;
"(B) gave such value in reliance on incorrect information contained in any
public registry of security interests or liens; and
"(C) either"(i) took possession of the property, whether or not such creditor
actually could take possession of the property; or
"(ii) satisfied any applicable non-bankruptcy law such that no creditor
on a simple contract could have obtained a prior judicial lien on such
property whether or not such a creditor exists."
(b) Preferences. Section 547(e)(l)(B) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
striking "creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien" and inserting
"good faith purchaser for value of such fixture or property that reasonably relied on
available information cannot acquire an interest".
Id.
3 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
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"lien creditor" with regard to personal property, to that of a "good faith
purchaser for value."
Curiously, at the time of this Symposium, section 103 was
politically dead. 4 An assault on a corpse seems redundant, indeed
perverse, and hence this response would be doubly perverse but for the
fact that proposed section 103, with whatever flaws (real or imagined)
responded to a very real, very live, concern about Revised Article 9.
Under Revised Article 9, a secured creditor, who, prior to lending,
checked the filing system and reasonably relied on a financing
statement that contained incorrect information about the debtor's
address, and/or the debtor's status as a corporation, and/or the debtor's
jurisdiction of organization, would be protected.5 An unsecured creditor
who similarly relied would not.6 Such discrimination did not exist
under old Article 9,7 and it should be eliminated.
By contrast, as Harris and Mooney make clear in their essay, the
drafters of Revised Article 9 did not-and do not-think that this
discrimination is harmful, because they do not believe that such a
reliance interest exists. 8 In this brief essay, I seek (1) to show how
Revised Article 9 undercuts the unsecured creditors' ability to rely on
the Article 9 filing system; (2) to demonstrate that such a reliance
interest exists and is non-trivial, both in terms of honoring creditor
expectations ex post, and creating appropriate systemic incentives ex
ante; and (3) to suggest a solution that addresses the legitimate concern
of secured creditors about the burden on filers, without undercutting
creditor reliance.

4 It still is. See, e.g., ABIRoundtable Discussion:Remember When-Recollections of a Time
when Aggressive Accounting, Special Purpose Vehicles, Asset Light Companies and Executive
Stock Options Were Positive Attributes, I I AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003) ("DurbinDelahunt... really went nowhere beyond the proposal stage .... Senator Durbin was [not] in
any way prepared for the breadth and strength of the opposition to it from all quarters ... )
(statement of attorney Philip S. Corwin).
5 Revised U.C.C. § 9-338 (2000).
6 Id.

7 See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1998) ("A financing statement substantially complying with the
requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are not
seriously misleading.").
8 Harris and Mooney concede that this discrimination exists. They simply deem it "trivial."
See Harris & Mooney, supra note 1. I agree that my concern is not earthshaking. However,
neither would the cost of fixing section 9-338 be all that great. Rather than respond to this real
concern, Harris and Mooney feign an inability to understand what section 103 sought to do, and
hypothesize numerous hypothetical rationales, id, which they then treat as straw men, subjecting
them to sequential reductions to the absurd. See id. I don't know what section 103 sought to do
either, but I do know what's wrong with section 9-338, and contend that the point is neither
"incoherent" nor "trivial." As such, I seek to show what a well-drafted statute along the lines of
section 103 might seek to achieve.
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1.
My concern can best be understood in historical context. Under
former Article 9, a secured creditor who sought to perfect a security
interest by filing was required to file a financing statement that
contained certain information designed to put potential creditors on
notice of its interest in the debtor's property. 9 The required items were
(1) the name and address of the debtor; (2) the name and address of the
secured party; and (3) a description of the collateral.' 0 Incorrect
information did not fulfill the notice function, and Article 9-402
required that the financing statement not contain errors that were
"seriously misleading.'' u
The consequence of filing a seriously misleading financing
statement was straightforward.
The financing statement was
"[in]sufficient"' 12 and "[in]effective."1 3 The creditor's security interest
was "unperfected," and would lose a priority battle with (1) a perfected
secured creditor; (2) a lien creditor; and hence (3) the bankruptcy trustee
(who holds the status of a "hypothetical lien creditor").' 4 If one wanted
the benefits of a property interest that beat third parties, one had to jump
through the hoops.
Invalidation of a misleading financing statement benefited all
consensual creditors who relied directly or indirectly on the Article 9
filing system-perfected secured creditors, lien creditors, and the
bankruptcy trustee. Subsequent secured creditors and the bankruptcy
trustee received the same treatment in priority battles with a prior
inaccurate filer. 5 Even non-consensual creditors benefited, though they
9 U.C.C. § 9402(1). Former section 9402(1) provided:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the secured
party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from which
information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address
of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of
collateral.
Id
10 Former section 9402(1) also required the signature of the debtor. Id. Revised Article 9
does away with that requirement, and replaces it with the requirement of authorization in an
authenticated record. Revised U.C.C. § 9-509.
11 U.C.C. § 9-402(8).
12 Id. § 9-402(1).
13 Id.§ 9-402(8).
14 Id. § 9-301.
15 Id.§ 9-402(8). Indeed, this equality has roots in the history of secured credit, and its
interrelationship with the law of fraudulent conveyances. Historically, in the absence of a statute
which provided a mechanism for giving notice, non-possessory property interests in personal
property were viewed as frauds against unsecured creditors. Only with the advent of various
personal property security acts in the nineteenth century, and the passage of Article 9 in the
middle of the twentieth century did personal property security interests become a routine
financing device. See, e.g., Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812)
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did not rely on the filing system at all.
Revised Article 9 changed all that. Revised section 9-516(b)
includes an augmented list of information about organizational filers
(type of organization, organizational jurisdiction, and organizational
16
identification number) that must be included on a financing statement.
This additional information is useful to searchers, so long as it is
correct. If information listed in section 9-516(b) is missing the filing
officer is supposed to reject the filing.' 7 More information is good, and
this is not the basis of my concern. According to Harris and Mooney,
participants in the drafting process expressed concern that increasing the
amount of required information would correspondingly increase the risk
of filer error (and the resulting harsh consequences). 8 Accordingly a
compromise was struck; the secured creditors agreed to place the
burden of filer error on the unsecured creditors, but spared themselves. 19
The mechanics of the compromise were twofold:
0 First, a distinction was drawn between information that was
required for effectiveness and information that was
required by the filing office. The name of the debtor, the

(discussing the statute of 13 Elizabeth, the English statute governing fraudulent conveyances, and
its re-enactment in New York); Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1601); see also GRANT
GILMORE, SECURIY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 129-38 (1965).
16 Revised section 9-516(b) (Refusal to accept record; filing does not occur) provides, in
pertinent part:
Filing does not occur with respect to a record that a filing office refuses to accept
because:
(5) in the case of an initial financing statement or an amendment that provides a
name of a debtor which was not previously provided in the financing statement to
which the amendment relates, the record does not:
(A) provide a mailing address for the debtor;
(B) indicate whether the debtor is an individual or an organization; or
(C) if the financing statement indicates that the debtor is an organization,
provide:
(i) a type of organizationfor the debtor;
(ii) ajurisdictionoforganizationfor the debtor; or
(iii) an organizationalidentification number for the debtor or indicate
that the debtor has none....
Revised U.C.C. § 9-516(b) (2001) (emphasis added).
17 Id. § 9-520(a) ("A filing office shall refuse to accept a record for filing for a reason set
forth in Section 9-516(b) and may refuse to accept a record for filing only for a reason set forth in
Section 9-516(b).").
18 Harris & Mooney, supra note 1.
19 Id I do not doubt the political assessment, that without a compromise, the legislation
would have failed. I also agree that including additional information on the financing statement is
more likely to be helpful than harmful. However, I am not bound by a compromise struck during
the Uniform Law drafting process, and neither is Congress. Accordingly, if the additional
information is good, why not give searchers a real remedy if the information provided is
inaccurate? More importantly, I fail to see the justification for actually reducing the amount of
"important information" by eliminating "address of the debtor" from the information required for
effectiveness under section 9-502.
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name of the secured party, and a description of the
collateral were required for effectiveness, while the
addresses of the secured party and debtor, along with the
new organizational information were relegated to the
20
second, less important, category.
* Second, with regard to the consequences of erroneous
information in the "less important" category, a distinction
was drawn between secured creditors and purchasersfor
21
value on the one hand, and lien creditors on the other.
Under the compromise, a financing statement that contains seriously
misleading information of the less important (section 9-516(b)) type is
still sufficient to trump the interests of a lien creditor but not that of a
secured creditor.
It is this second change that is troubling. This change undoes the
historic parity between secured creditors and lien creditors that existed
under old Article 9. Lack of parity, is not, however, the only concern.
This change has consequences that matter. Imagine that a corporate
group consisted of three corporations, "Jones Corporation" ("JC") the
parent, "Jones Corporation, Inc.," ("JCI") a subsidiary, and "Jones,
Inc.," ("JI") a separate operating subsidiary. Jones Corporation is a
Delaware Corporation, but the other two entities are New York
Corporations. The tax ID numbers for the three companies are 1, 2, and
3 respectively. Big Bank takes a security interest in the assets of all
three companies, filing financing statements against JC in Delaware,
and JI in New York. By mistake, or on purpose, Big Bank files an
erroneous financing statement in New York, which lists JCI's correct
name, but contains incorrect section 9-516(b) information.
The
jurisdiction of incorporation is listed as Delaware, the address line lists
the address of JC's chief executive offices in Wilmington, and the Tax
ID number is listed as 1, instead of 2.
20 For effectiveness, a financing statement need only list the name of the debtor, the name of
the secured party, and a description of the collateral. Revised U.C.C. § 9-502. By contrast, the
filing officer may reject a filing if any of the items listed in section 9-516(b) are missing.
21 Revised U.C.C. section 9-338 provides:
If a security interest or agricultural lien is perfected by a filed financing statement
providing information described in section 9-516(b)(5) which is incorrect at the time
the financing statement is filed:
1) the security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to a conflicting
perfected security interest in the collateral to the extent that the holder of the
conflicting security interest gives value in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect
information; and
2) a purchaser, other than a secured party, of the collateral takes free of the
security interest or agricultural lien to the extent that, in reasonable reliance upon
the incorrect information, the purchaser gives value and, in the case of chattel
paper, documents, goods, instruments, or a security certificate, receives delivery
of the collateral.
Id. § 9-338.

1900

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25:5

Now imagine Second Bank looks at the record, concludes
(reasonably) 2 2 that the erroneous financing statement covered JC (the
Delaware Corporation), not JCI (the New York Corporation), and as a
result makes an unsecured loan to JCI. Because of section 9-338,
Second Bank would still lose in a priority battle with Big Bank, even
though it was Big Bank which filed the incorrect information. Indeed,
even if JCI defaulted, and Second Bank obtained a judgment lien, its
lien would still be subordinate to that of Big Bank. By contrast, if a
different lender, Finance Company, relied-in exactly the same wayon the erroneous information in the record, but loaned on a secured
basis, its security interest would take priority over Big Bank's judgment
lien. In sum, because of section 9-516(b)'s distinction between
important and unimportant information, the unsecured judgment lien
creditor would lose to the erroneous filer, while a secured creditor who
23
went through the same investigation would win.
In short, unsecured creditors are not entitled to rely on erroneous
section 9-516(b) information placed in the filing system by secured
creditors (whether inadvertently or with intent to deceive). Secured
creditors, by contrast, have recourse. To put it another way, at least in
this regard, Revised Article 9 does not protect unsecured creditors who
reasonably rely on incorrect information in the Article 9 filing system; it
protects only "secured" creditors.
This discrimination seems unfair, but even more troubling is Harris
and Mooney's explanation for why the change is appropriate. Harris
and Mooney state simply: "The bankruptcy trustee neither looks at the
financing statement, nor gives value, nor relies (let alone reasonably
relies)" on the information contained in the filing system. 24 This
assertion is incorrect, and the error matters.
22 Harris and Mooney state that such reliance would not be reasonable because a financing
statement filed under the name of the proposed debtor, even with an incorrect address,
organization of jurisdiction, and organizational identification number, would be sufficient to put
the prospective lender on "inquiry notice." Harris & Mooney, supra note 1. Even assuming that
they are right, it would not be difficult to fix this problem. For example, what if the name of the
debtor were incorrect as well, listing the debtor as Jones Corporation? There would then be a
New York financing statement containing the name, address, and organization ofjurisdiction and
tax identification number of a real Delaware corporation. Perversely (though this is a topic for
another day), that financing statement would still be sufficient to perfect a security interest in
JCI's assets so long as the search logic of the New York Secretary of State's Office would reveal
the incorrect financing statement when the Bank searched under the debtor's correct name (JCI).
Revised U.C.C. § 9-506(c). Harris and Mooney might argue in response that this means it is
unreasonable to lend. This, proves too much, however, unless they are willing to admit that
Revised Article 9 has, in one fell swoop, destroyed the ability of people named "Smith" or
"Jones"-or in New York, "Schwartz"-to obtain secured credit.
23 Indeed, this creates the possibility, perhaps only theoretical, of a circular priority problem.
If the Second Bank became a lien creditor, and then a later secured creditor ("SP2") loaned, the
priority would be as follows: Big Bank would beat Second Bank. SP2 would beat Big Bank; but
Second Bank would beat SP2.
24 Harris & Mooney, supra note 1.
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II.
Harris and Mooney take the view that the TIB never looks at the
Article 9 filing system, so there is no reason to give the trustee priority
25
over an Article 9 creditor who files an erroneous financing statement.
This statement fundamentally misconstrues both the role of the
bankruptcy trustee, and the role of the filing system in the secured credit
system. This misunderstanding caused the drafters to undercut both the
utility of the filing system, and to alter the existing balance between
secured and unsecured creditors.
On one level Harris and Mooney are indisputably correct when
they state that a TIB does not rely on the filing system before extending
credit. This is true by definition, but this is not only a tautology, it is
also irrelevant. The TIB is not appointed, and the legal status of the
TIB does not arise until the debtor files a bankruptcy petition. The TIB
never extends credit him or herself, but the TIB succeeds to the
position, and acts on behalf of the creditors who extended credit before
the petition was filed. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes this expressly,
in section 544, when it states that the TIB's status as a hypothetical lien
creditor operates "without regard to any knowledge of the TIB or of any
creditor." 26 Even though the TIB never looks at the filing system prepetition, he or she stands in the shoes of people who either did look,
could have looked, or relied on others who looked at the files.
Thus, Harris and Mooney cannot be relying on the TIB's lack of
knowledge, they appear instead to be saying something even more
radical-that unsecured creditors as a class never look at the filing
system. While it is certainly true that many unsecured creditors do not
check the filing system, it is not true that no unsecured creditors do so,
and even those who do not look often rely on it. To understand this
point, imagine a department store chain. Such a company will have a
wide variety of creditors, but for these purposes they can be divided into
three groups: bank lenders, trade creditors, and employees. Each has a
different relation to the filing system:
0 A bank lender who loans to a business is likely to check the
filing system, and determine whether there are any secured
lenders. They are likely to include negative covenants in
their loan documents, which prohibit secured debts and
make it a default if the debtor's property is liened. Such an
unsecured creditor certainly relies on the filing system, and
if it has not become a lien creditor prior to bankruptcy,
25 Id.

26 1t U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
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relies on the TIB's hypothetical lien creditor status for any
recovery in bankruptcy.
* Trade creditors, such as inventory suppliers, do not
generally search the UCC records, but it is not unusual for
the credit manager to check a company's Dun and
Bradstreet report before initiating a credit relationship, and
periodically thereafter. A Dun and Bradstreet report
summarizes the financial position of the debtor, listing both
secured and unsecured debt. This too relies on the filing
system (through Dun and Bradstreet), and on the trustee.
" While many trade creditors do not even conduct this level
of investigation, they often look at what other suppliers are
doing, and in this regard they free-ride on the investigation
conducted by bank lenders, and diligent suppliers.
* Finally, while rank and file employees certainly do not
search the filing system, this hardly seems a reason to
subordinate them to the secured creditor. To the extent that
they rely on the discipline of credit markets to ensure that
their employer remains creditworthy, they too rely
indirectly on the filing system, and on other creditors to
27
monitor the debtor.
Therefore, section 9-338 disables even those unsecured creditors
who do look at the filing system and are fooled. By contrast, a similarly
situated secured creditor would take priority because of the erroneous
information. The policy issue is not punishment, but fairness. A
secured creditor controls the information that they place in the public
record. Imagine that a lender places information in the record that is so
erroneous that it misleads two reasonable creditors, one of whom takes
a security interest, and the other of whom does not. There is no reason
to treat these two creditors differently. If the state of the record is suoh
that another creditor could come along and lend in reliance upon it, and
then be primed by the pre-existing creditor-the section 9-338 state of
affairs-we have done violence to the assumption that unsecured
creditors can protect themselves by looking at information that is
publicly available.
Indeed, this is the heart of the matter. Not only is section 9-338
unfair, it is inefficient. By privileging secured creditors over unsecured
creditors without notice, Revised Article 9 allows secured creditors yet
another opportunity to externalize risk, at the expense of unsecured
creditors, and works a complete reversal of the historical role of the

27 Another section of the Durbin-Delahunt Bill, S. 2798, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. § 203
(2002), would have addressed this problem more directly by giving certain employee claims

priority over secured claims.
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filing system. 28 Harris and Mooney seem to forget that unsecured credit
was once the norm, and debt secured by personal property was an
illegitimate cousin of dubious reputation. Notice is the sine qua non for
recognizing a non-possessory security interest in personal property.
Historically, that notice has always been for the benefit of both
unsecured creditors who might seek to levy, and potential consensual
lien claimants.
Long ago, secured credit was viewed as criminal. In Twyne's
Case,29 the court of the Star Chamber convicted Twyne for opposing a
sheriffs efforts to seize a debtor's property. Twyne took the position
that he had purchased the property from the Debtor. Lord Coke, for the
Court, listed Twyne's failure to take possession of the property as one
of a number of badges of fraud. Secret liens were fraudulent as to
The filing system
unsecured creditors and potential purchasers.
"solves" the secret lien problem, but only if the information is accurate.
Inaccuracies burden both unsecured creditors and secured creditors; it is
baffling why the drafters of section 9-338 saw it as fair, appropriate, or
efficient to draw a distinction in favor Gf secured creditors who search
the filing system, and against unsecured creditors who make the same
search.
III.
While proposed section 103 of the Durbin-Delahunt Bill generated
a commotion and formed the basis for Harris and Mooney's article, this
should not obscure the inequity created by section 9-338. A simple
solution to the problem created by section 9-338 would be to subject all
errors on a financing statement to the "seriously misleading" standard.
If a secured lender placed incorrect information in the filing system that
could mislead a reasonable subsequent creditor, secured, or unsecured,
the filer would lose to such a subsequent secured creditor, to a judgment
lien obtained by a misled unsecured creditor, and to the bankruptcy
trustee. This would change the compromise struck during the drafting
process, it would reinstate the ability of unsecured creditors to rely on
the financing system, and enhance the secured creditor's incentive to
place accurate information in the filing system. Moreover, the
commercial risk would not be great. It is difficult to imagine that a
financing statement that lists the correct name of the debtor, as required
28 Notice is inherent in the concept of perfecting a security interest, and the importance of
notice to perfection of property interests long predates Article 9. Real property mortgage filing
systems have a long provenance, and notice was also a function of pre-Code security devices,
such as N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45 (1911) (codifying the Factor's Lien Act).
29 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1601).
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by section 9-502 will be deemed seriously misleading because of
erroneous information of the type listed in section 9-516(b). Only
where the erroneous information was of the type that would convince a
potential creditor that a different debtor (of the same name) was meant,
would the error mislead. 30 This seems unlikely to matter in very many
cases, except where the filer is either extremely careless or actively
seeks to deceive. More importantly, in the rare cases where this does
occur, the error would fool both potential secured and unsecured
creditors. Is it too much to ask that they receive the same treatment?

30 However, contrary to Harris and Mooney's assertion, see Harris & Mooney, supra note 1,
just because I acknowledge that fixing section 9-338 will not affect the result in many cases, or in
all likelihood lead to many decided cases, does not mean that the change is not commercially
significant. Fixing section 9-338 will increase the secured party's incentive to ensure that they
place accurate information in the public filing system, and impose consequences if they do not.

